文|乐山

2013年的巴菲特致股东信中，84岁的巴老又一次用两个案例说明了价值投资基本的逻辑。

在股市上进行投资，很容易被股价的每天波动影响，能够拿得住股票，不仅是一种技能，更是一种哲学信仰。

现将巴老的全文摘录如下：

Some Thoughts About Investing

关于投资的一些思考（摘自巴菲特2013年股东信）:

Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.

–The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

最聪明的投资，是把它当作生意一样看待。–《聪明的投资者》，作者：本杰明·格雷厄姆

It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know aboutinvesting to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let mefirst tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth bymuch, they are instructive.

引本·格雷厄姆的话作为本章开头非常恰当，因为我对投资的理解很多都归功于本。后面我会讲一些本的事情，我还会讲到股票投资。但是让我先讲两个很早以前非股票投资的投资例子吧。虽然两笔投资对我个人财富的影响并不大，但它们却具有启发意义。

This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices,caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small ruralbanks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers andtheir lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recentGreat Recession.

事情发生在内布拉斯加。1973到1981年间，中西部农场价格疯涨，原因是对通货膨胀的预期和一些小型农村银行宽松的贷款政策。后来泡沫破灭了，价格下跌了50%多，这摧毁了借债的农场主和他们的债权人。那次泡沫中爱荷华和内布拉斯加倒闭的银行数量是刚过去的大萧条中倒闭的五倍。

In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me$280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothingabout operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of cornand soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, Icalculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivitywould improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.

1986年，我买下了奥马哈北部，距FDIC 50英里的400英亩农场，花了28万美元，比几年前银行贷给农场主买地的金额小得多。我对经营农场一窍不通，但是我儿子喜欢农场，我从他那里了解到玉米和大豆的产量，还有对应的运营成本。根据这些估计，我计算出农场的正常回报大约10%。我还考虑到，产量会逐步提高，并且作物的价格也会上涨。两个预期后来都被证明是对的。

I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside andpotentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimesdisappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under anypressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or morewhat I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.

我并不需要特别的知识或者智商来得出结论：这笔投资的进一步下跌的空间有限，同时可能有可观的上升空间。当然，糟糕的产量和价格偶尔会令人失望，但这又怎么样呢？同样也会有些好得异常的年份，并且我不用迫于压力出售资产。现在，28年过去了，农场的利润翻了三倍，价值是我们当初投资额的五倍。我依然对农场一窍不通，而且最近才第二次去到那片农场。

In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was thecompany’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was

selling. Again, a bubble had popped – this one involvingcommercial real estate – and the RTC had been created todispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.

1993年，我做了另外一小笔投资。当我还是Salomon的CEO的时候，所罗门的房东Larry Silverstein告诉我纽约大学旁边Resolution Trust Corp.的一块零售物业打算出售。同样，当时泡沫破裂——RTC被建立以处置储蓄机构的资产，正是那些遭殃的储蓄机构当初乐观的贷款政策加速了那些盲目投资。

Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield fromthe property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increasewhen several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant – who occupied around 20% of theproject’s space – was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of thisbargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was alsosuperb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.

这里的分析同样简单。和农场的情况类似，该物业当时无杠杆的收益率是10%。但是考虑到RTC糟糕的管理，空置的店铺出租以后收入还会增加。更重要的是，它的最大租客–约占20%左右的出租面积，仅仅支付每平方尺5美元的租金，而其他租客的平均租金是70美元。它的租约将在9年内到期，到时盈利必然可以大幅上升。物业的位置也是非常理想的：纽约大学绝不会搬走。

I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was anexperienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it theydid. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equityinvestment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed severalspecial distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.

包括Larry和我的朋友Fred Rose的团队买下了这个物业。Fred是一位经验丰富，高水准的房地产投资者，而且他的家族将会管理这个物业。他们接手了。旧的租约到期后，利润翻了三倍。年租金回报现在达到了当初投资额的35%。另外，我们最初的按揭贷款在1996年和1999年两次进行了再融资，这让我们获得了相当于初始投资额150%的特别租金回报。我至今还没去看过这块物业。

Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Thoughthe gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and,subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.

农场和纽约大学物业的收入未来几十年还会继续增加。虽然他们的收入不会突然激增，但两笔投资都是我和我的孩子甚至孙子辈可以一辈子持有的稳固并且令人满意的投资。

I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:

我讲这两个故事是为了阐明投资的基本道理：

•You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, youmust recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simpleand don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”

•获取满意的投资回报不需要成为专家。当然如果大家本身不是专家，那就要认识到自己的能力圈，并遵从一个可行的方法。保持简单，不要投资自己不懂的东西。当有人承诺让你赚笔快钱时，立即答复“不行”。

•Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a roughestimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate everyinvestment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.

•关注你所考虑投资的资产未来的产出。如果大家觉得难以估计一项资产的未来盈利，那就忘了它，放弃它。没有人能估计所有资产的回报。无所不知也是不需要的；你只需要理解自己的行为就够了。

•If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating.There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and Iam skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their firsttoss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact thata given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.

•如果大家关注的是资产未来可能被接手的价格，那么这就是投机。投机没有什么不好，但是我知道我不能总是投机正确，我也怀疑那些声称自己可以持续投机成功的人。玩掷硬币游戏时第一轮有一半人会赢；但是这些“赢家”如果继续不断玩下去就不会有赢家。另外，一项资产近来持续升值绝不是一个买入的理由。

•With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at allabout their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field – not by thosewhose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stockprices, give it a try on weekdays.l

•在两笔投资上，我都只考虑资产的产出，而不是它们每天的市场估值。最后的赢家是把精力用在球场上的人，而不是紧盯着计分板的人。如果大家周末不看股价的时候可以放轻松，那么试着工作日的时候也这样做。

•Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time.Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hearTV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’sscathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)

•总结宏观形势，听信别人的宏观或者市场预测都是浪费时间。实际上，这甚至是危险的，它会模糊大家对真正重要的事实的看法。（每当我听到电视评论员流利地分析着市场的下一步走势，我就会想起Mickey Mantle(10)犀利的评论：“你不坐到直播间里去都不知道原来棒球比赛这么简单”。）

(10)米奇·查理斯·曼托（Mickey Charles Mantle，1931年10月20日－1995年8月13日）是1974年被选入名人堂的美国职业棒球员。他生涯18个球季都效力于纽约洋基队，赢得3座美联MVP以及入选16次明星赛。曼托参加过12次世界大赛并拥有7枚世界大赛冠军戒指。1995年曼托因肝癌去世，享年63岁。（维基百科）

•My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock marketmight do in the years immediately following – 1987 and 1994 – was of no importance to me in makingthose investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the

chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.l

•我的两笔投资分别在1986年和1993年做出。接下来经济、利率、或者股市在下一年–1987和1994年–会如何发展对两笔投资都没有影响。我已经不记得当时的报纸头条和专家的意见。但是庄稼依旧在内布拉斯加生长，学生们一样到纽约大学上课。

There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocksprovide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farmor the New York real estate.

我的两笔投资和股票投资有一个重要的区别：股票每分钟都有报价，但是我至今也没有见过农场和纽约大学物业的市场报价。

It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuationsplaced on their holdings – and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering myproperty yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his – and those pricesvaried widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state – how in the world could I be other thanbenefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I wouldbuy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.

疯狂波动的股价本该成为股票投资者的一项巨大优势–对其中部分投资者来说是这样。毕竟如果有一个喜怒无常的人每天给我报价，买入或者卖出农场–并且价格在短期内随着他的心情忽上忽下，那我不就可以从它疯狂的行动中赚钱吗？如果他的报价低的可笑，而我又有些闲钱，那我就会买入农场。如果他的报价高得要命，那我就把自己的卖给他或者只是继续种地。

Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow ownerscause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interestrates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits – and, worse yet,important to consider acting upon their comments.

股票投资者却经常让其他投资者善变的，并且通常不理性的行为所影响。因为有太多关于市场、经济、利率和股价走势的评论，一些投资者认为应该听听专家的建议–更糟糕的是，认为应该根据他们的建议买卖。

Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often becomefrenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering animplied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from theunqualified benefit it should be to a curse.

那些拥有一片农场或者一项房产时可以安静持有几十年的人，经常因为置身于源源不断的股价报价中和评论员们“别光坐着，你得做点什么”的鼓动而变得头脑发热。对这些投资者来说，流动性从一项绝对的优势变成了诅咒。

A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erraticand mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor ifhe has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; aeuphoric world is your enemy.

“闪电暴跌”或者其他一些市场的极端波动不会伤害投资者，就好像一个飘忽不定、爱说大话的邻居不会影响我的农场投资。本来涨涨跌跌的市场对那些真正的投资者来说是好事，如果他有现金在价格跌破价值时购入的话。熊市是投资者的好朋友；牛市才是投资者的敌人。

During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling myfarm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of asolid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. Sowhy would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of themmight eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth wasgoing to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?

在刚刚过去的2008年金融危机中，我从没想过要卖掉农场或者纽约大学的物业，即便一段严重的衰退即将到来。如果我拥有一项长期前景不错的业务100%的权益，光是考虑卖掉它的想法都非常愚蠢。那我为什么要考虑卖掉那些优秀业务的小比例持股？确实，它们中一些会令人失望，但是作为整体而言它总体会非常不错。真的有人相信美国无与伦比的物质资本和人力资本将会毁于一旦吗？

************

When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is verysimilar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimatean earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at areasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimatefuture earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have workedtogether, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the viewsof other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.

查理和我买股票的时候，我们把它都当作获得部分生意所有权的投资看待，和买下整个公司的分析类似。首先我们要考虑是否能够估计公司未来5年，或者更长时间内的盈利。如果答案是可以，那我们就会在对应估值区间下限的价格上买入股票。如果我们不具备估计未来盈利的能力–经常是这样–那我们就去考虑其他投资。合作54年来，我们从来没有因为宏观或者政治环境的因素，或者因为其他人的看法放弃过有吸引力的投资。实际上，这些都不是我们做投资决策时会考虑的因素。

It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside ofit. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters thatoccur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and adesire to be where the action is.

认清自己“能力圈”的半径，并且呆在能力圈里面非常重要。即便做到了，有时候我们还是会犯错误，无论买股票还是收购公司。但是这样做不会带来灾难，就像一个持续上涨的牛市诱导大家根据价格走势买股票，或者因为需要有所行动的欲望买股票那样。

Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise,they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.

对多数的投资者而言，研究公司的前景并非生活的重点。于是，他们可能认为自己并不具备足够的知识来理解公司和预测公司未来的盈利能力。

I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate,American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, inunpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497,paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to besubstantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners – neither he nor his “helpers” can dothat – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost

S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.

我有一个好消息告诉这些非专业人士：一般投资者并不需要那些技能。总体而言，美国的公司长期以来都表现很好，并且还会欣欣向荣（当然一定会有起起伏伏）。20世纪的一百年里，道琼斯指数从66点涨到了11,497点，分红不断提高，21世纪一样会有丰厚的回报。非专业投资者的目标不应该是挑出优胜企业——他和他的“帮手”都做不到，而是应该配置一个跨行业的组合，整体而言其回报必定不错。一个低费率的标普500指数基金就可以实现这个目标。

That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger isthat the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then becomedisillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. Itfeels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over along period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the“know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory

results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better longterm results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.

以上就是非专业投资者所需的“做什么”。“ 择时”也同样重要。主要的风险是，胆小投资者的或者投资新手可能在牛市入场，并且在出现浮亏时离场。（记住巴顿·比格斯(11)的话：“牛市就像性爱一样，在结束之前达到高潮。”）解决“择时”问题的办法是，在一个较长的时间内逐步买入，并且无论利空满天还是股价新高都不卖出。遵守这些规则，“无知”并且保持多元组合和低费率的投资者一定会获得满意的回报。实际上，认识到自身不足的简单投资者长期将会战胜那些哪怕只是忽略了一个弱点的专业投资者。

(11) 巴顿·比格斯，在美国整个投资界的声誉和影响力几乎可与索罗斯、朱利安等一班金融大鳄匹敌。多次被《机构投资者》杂志评选为“美国第一投资策略师”，著有《对冲基金风云录》。（百度百科）

If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of theircrops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earningsrealized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice andswitched properties.

如果农场投资者时常买卖他们的农场，产量和庄稼的价格都不会增加。唯一的结果就是农场所有者的最终收益由于咨询和交易费用显著下降。

Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profitfrom giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors inaggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in afarm.

不过，无论是机构还是个人，都会被赚取咨询和交易费的中介机构不断怂恿，不停地交易。对投资者来说，这些费用总和非常巨大，它吞噬了利润。所以，忽略那些建议吧，保持最低的交易成本，并且像持有农场那样持有股票。